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REPLACING THE SOCIAL SECURITY TAX WITH A
VALUE-ADDED TAX: POLICY PERSPECTIVES
John F. Kelly*
Joseph L. Lewis**
William J. Irvin***
On October 22, 1979, Representative Al Ullman (D-Ore.), then
Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, introduced
the Tax Restructuring Act of 1979,1 which would have lowered the
rates of the individual income, corporate income and social secur-
ity taxes along with certain other tax benefits and would have re-
placed the lost revenues from such reductions with the revenues
from a 10% value-added tax (VAT). The introduction of the bill
followed a speech delivered by Sen. Russell B. Long (D-La.), then
Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, at the 1978 Tulane
Tax Institute, in which he advocated an overhaul of the tax system
similar to the proposals contained in Ullman's bill.2 Although there
was nothing particularly novel in the proposals of Long and Ull-
man, the mere fact that the two members of Congress with the
most influence over tax legislation were advocating a major over-
haul of the entire tax system was enough to spark a lively debate
on the merits of substituting a value-added tax for part or all of
the components making up the present federal tax system in the
United States.
After less than a year of enlightened debate on the merits of the
bill and of a VAT in general (and in the middle of a re-election
campaign in which his opponent was attacking the bill), Ullman
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1. H.R. REP. No. 5665, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979).
2. Long, Remarks Before the Tulane Tax Institute, 53 TuLAN L. REv. 307 (1979).
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withdrew his proposal and vowed never to reintroduce it, citing an
oft-stated fear that the new tax would allow Congress to raise the
total tax burden rather than supplant present tax burdens.3 Sena-
tor Long also waffled, expressing contentment to let the public be-
come educated about the tax and accept it without active prodding
from his committee.4 Ullman's subsequent defeat in his bid for re-
election and Long's loss of the chairmanship of the Senate Finance
Committee due to the shift to Republican control of the Senate
further diminishes the possibility of resurrection of a VAT.
Although the Ullman bill is dead and the VAT concept has been
placed on the back burner, it is the intent of this article to summa-
rize arguments for and against such a tax, analyzing it from a
standpoint of accepted tax policy, and to suggest where further de-
bate should be focused if the VAT is ever resurrected. This article
is not intended to present a scholarly analysis of economic or polit-
ical consequences of enacting a VAT or resolve the theoretical con-
troversies which have been debated, but merely to place the tax in
perspective as it would affect the United States' existing federal
tax system.
I. BACKGROUND AND MECHANICS OF VAT
Apparently, the value-added tax was first proposed in Germany
in 1918 to replace the newly established turnover tax (a sales tax
which taxed the full sales price at each stage in the production and
distribution process, without allowing a credit for tax paid on pre-
vious transactions). 5 The idea found its way to the United States
in 19 2 1 ,e where it sparked some interest among academicians. In
1940 a VAT bill was introduced in Congress and the VAT concept
became the subject of an extensive analysis by the Division of Tax
Research in the Treasury Department.7 The first practical applica-
tion of the VAT concept came in 1954 when France adopted a
3. 10 TAX. NoTEs 392 (March 24, 1980).
4. Id.
5. The Treasury Report on the Value-Added Tax, 8 TAX No'rs 315 (March 19, 1979)
(citing Due, The Value-Added Tax, 1965 W. EcoN. J. 165).
6. The Treasury Report on the Value-Added Tax, 8 TAX NoTs 315 (March 19, 1979)
[hereinafter cited as Treasury Report].
7. Id.
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value-added tax to replace its manufacturer's sales tax.8 In 1967
the Common Market countries approved the tax, and as of this
writing, twenty-seven countries, most of them in Europe, Central
America and South America, have adopted such a tax.9 Substantial
interest in the VAT system has arisen in the United States during
the past ten years as a result of its popularity in western Europe.
The European countries have found the VAT preferable to the
"cumulative cascade turnover taxes" which were commonly used
prior to adoption of the VAT system. The cascade tax is a form of
sales tax which applies each time a product changes hands in the
successive stages of its manufacture and sale; because of its cumu-
lative nature, it results in a tax on a tax.1°
European governments prefer the VAT to the retail sales tax
(which has the same incidence and economic effect) because recal-
citrant retailers made collection of the retail sales tax quite diffi-
cult." In contrast, the VAT is self-policing since each business en-
tity must report the tax collected on its purchases to insure credit
upon resale to its own vendees.
Adoption of a VAT in the United States has been advocated by
such groups as the United States Chamber of Commerce, The
Committee for Economic Development, and The First National
City Bank (New York);' 2 one recent President of the United States
even advocated its adoption.13
Although a detailed description of the mechanics of a value-ad-
ded tax system is beyond the scope of this article and has been
8. Id.
9. For a table showing comparative rates of these countries as of 1979, see Tait, The
Value-Added Tax: A Worldwide Problem or Solution?, 9 TAX Noras 611 (Nov. 19, 1979).
10. Butler, The Value-Added Tax: A New $40 Billion Tax for the United States?, 50
TEXAS L. Rxv. 267-71 (1972); American Bar Association, Section of Taxation, Report of the
Special Subcommittee of the Committee on General Tax Problems on the Value-Added
Tax, 24 TAx LAW. 419 (1971).
11. Krauss, A U.S. Sales Tax Would Be Preferable to a Value-Added Tax, 10 TAX NOTEs
131 (Feb. 4, 1980).
12. Treasury Report, supra note 6, at 315.
13. Subcommittee of the Special Committee on Value-Added Tax, Should the United
States Adopt the Value-Added Tax?-A Survey of the Policy Considerations and the Data
Base, 26 TAx LAW. 45 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Policy Considerations]. President Nixon
proposed a VAT in February, 1972 as an alternative to state residential and all local real
estate taxes for the support of schools.
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adequately covered elsewhere, 14 a general understanding of the
mechanics is prerequisite to an assessment of the system from an
economic and tax policy standpoint. There are several ways in
which the tax base can be computed, but the system adopted by
the European Common Market countries appears to be the sim-
plest to compute and was the basis for the Ullman proposal. Under
the Common Market value-added taxes,1 5 the taxes paid by a busi-
ness on its purchases (including purchases of capital equipment)
are subtracted from the taxes it has collected on its sales and the
difference is remitted to the government. Any credit created by
more tax having been paid on purchases than collected on sales
can either be carried to succeeding months or refunded. Since the
ultimate consumer gets no credit for a later sale, the net tax base
of the system is the equivalent of a tax on sales to individual con-
sumers, which differs from a retail sales tax only in that the reve-
nues are collected by the government at the earlier stages of pro-
duction and distribution.
A description of the technical details that would have to be con-
sidered if a value-added tax were instituted is unnecessary for the
purposes of assessing basic economic and tax policy considerations.
Nevertheless, a brief explanation of the workings of the Ullman
VAT will contribute to a better understanding of some of the prob-
lem areas in a VAT system, which in turn will provide a basis for
restructuring the tax before it is proposed again.
A. Ullman's Bill: H.R. 5665
Focusing only on the value-added tax aspects of The Tax Re-
structuring Act of 1979,16 the bill would have imposed a value-ad-
14. The Section of Taxation of the American Bar Association established committees and
subcommittees to explain and evaluate the value-added tax. For a detailed description of
the mechanisms of a VAT, see Evaluation of an Additive-Method Value-Added Tax for
Use in the United States, 30 TAx LAW. 565 (1977); Report of the Special Subcommittee of
the Committee on General Income Tax Problems on the Value-Added Tax, 24 TAx LAW.
419 (1971) [hereinafter cited as General Income Tax Problems]; Technical Problems in De-
signing a Broad-Based Value-Added Tax for the United States, 28 TAX LAW. 193 (1975).
15. See generally, Carlson, Value-Added Tax: European Lessons for the United States,
11 TAx No'rxs 811 (Oct. 27, 1980).
16. In addition to the value-added tax provisions, the Tax Restructuring Act of 1979 in-
cluded the following provisions:
(1) Individual income tax reductions $50 billion-$42 billion, reduce taxes by reducing the
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ded tax on sales of property and services in the United States at
each stage of the production and distribution process (including
the retail stage) and on imports. 17 The tax would generally have
been 10% of the value of the property or services and the amount
of tax would have been itemized separately on each invoice except
an invoice to the ultimate consumer, where it would simply have
been included in the price of the property or services.,, Each busi-
ness in the production and distribution chain would have received
a credit for the value-added tax paid by it on purchases of prop-
erty and services from other businesses.1 9
Instead of the 10% rate, certain items would have been subject
to a 5 % rate: (1) the retail sale of food and non-alcoholic beverages
for human consumption, (2) the sale and rental of residential real
property for use by the purchaser or tenant as a principal resi-
dence, and (3) medical care and prescription drugs. Additionally, a
zero rate would have been imposed on charitable organizations, ed-
ucational activities of governments and nonprofit institutions,
mass transportation, exports, and interest.20 Even though a zero
lowest rate from 14% to 10% and the highest rate from 70% to 50%, and the maximum
capital gains rate to 20%; help for lower income taxpayers by expanding the earned income
credit, making the credit for elderly refundable and adjusting payments to A.F.D.C. recipi-
ents; provide savings incentives by a deferred savings account, to which one could contribute
$1,000 each year and the interest would not be taxed until withdrawn, and a dividend rein-
vestment plan, by which one could defer tax on up to $1,500 of dividends in any year if they
were invested in a qualified dividend reinvestment plan; increase the maximum deductible
contribution to an I.R.A. from $1,500 to $2,000, and allow persons covered by pension plans
to establish an LR.A. and make deductible contributions of up to $1,000 per year.
(2) Business income tax reductions ($28 billion)-reduce the maximum corporate tax
rate from 46% to 36% and lower the existing graduated tax rates from 17, 20, 30, and 40%
to 15, 20, 25, and 30%; widen the brackets from $25,000 to $40,000; reduce the corporate
capital gains rate from 28% to 22%; liberalize the A.D.R. system of depreciation by allowing
shorter useful lives without having to elect the rest of the A.D.R. system; provide a full
investment credit for an asset with a useful life of five or more years and 60% of the credit
for an asset with a useful life of three of four years.
(3) Social security ($52 billion)-reduce both the employer and employee share of social
security taxes to 4.5%, with comparable reductions for the self-employed. H.R. REP. No.
5665, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979).
17. 125 CONG. REC. H 9,494 (daly ed. Oct. 22, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Ullman).
18. Id. at H 9,494-96.
19. Id. at H 9,494.
20. Several months prior to withdrawing the bill, Ullman, reacting to criticism, intro-
duced the Tax Restructuring Act of 1980, H.R. REP. No. 7015, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980),
in an attempt to make the VAT more palatable by minimizing regressivity and restricting
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rate applies, which in essence means the activity is exempt from
the tax, the seller or supplier would still receive credits on
purchases.
B. Example: A Law Firm
A simple example will illustrate the mechanics of compliance.
Assume a medium-sized law firm collects $1,000,000 from its cli-
ents during the second quarter of 1980 for legal services rendered.
(It has made an election to file value-added tax returns on a quar-
terly basis, not monthly, and on a cash basis, not accrual). It also
receives $20,000 from the sale of a tax newsletter prepared by one
of its partners regarding ways to take advantage of loopholes in the
tax treaty between Germany and the United States, $5,000 of
which comes from United States customers and $15,000 of which
comes from German customers. Of the $1,000,000 received for legal
services, $50,000 is attributable to a partner's negotiations con-
ducted solely in Germany on behalf of a German corporation, on a
deal that did not materialize; another $75,000 is attributable to
handling the acquisition of a Swiss corporation by a United States
corporation, and it is reasonably estimated that one-third of the
partner's time was spent negotiating in Switzerland and the other
two-thirds negotiating, drafting documents, and closing the trans-
action in the United States. The only other income of the law firm
during the second quarter was $10,000 of interest earned on the
"Partners' Buy-Out Fund."
During the same quarter, the law firm paid the following ex-
penses: $50,000 for the purchase of library acquisitions; $125,000 in
rent; $80,000 for the purchase of a small computer having book-
keeping and word-processing capabilities; $25,000 for materials
and supplies; and $100,000 in salaries to employees. By the last
day of July (the first month following the end of the second calen-
dar quarter), the firm is required to file a value-added tax return
and pay tax computed as follows: the value of services rendered
government spending to a percentage of the gross national product, originally 22.6%, and
then gradually decreasing to and remaining at 20%. Under the new bill, food, shelter, medi-
cal expenses and sales to governments would have been exempted from the tax instead of
taxed at the reduced 5% rate under the original bill and the revenue generated would have
totaled $115 billion instead of $130 billion.
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which is subject to the tax is $950,000; the $50,000 attributable to
negotiations in Germany is excluded as an "export" service but the
services regarding the Swiss acquisition are included since at least
half of the service was performed inside the United States. Also
excluded from the base is the $10,000 in interest and the $15,000
in revenues from the tax newsletter sold in Germany, but the
$5,000 from sales of the newsletter in the United States is in-
cluded. Therefore, the firm owes, before credits, 10% of the
$955,000 earned from taxable sales and performance of services. It
gets a credit, however, for 10% of all the expenditures listed above
with the exception of employee salaries, even though the computer
and library books would be considered capital assets for income
tax purposes. The total credit, therefore, is $28,000, leaving a net
value-added tax liability of $67,500.
Note that a business that is expanding or making large acquisi-
tions of capital equipment or other property could build up credits
that exceed the tax payable, and could thereby become entitled to
a refund of the tax paid or carry over the credits to another period.
With this general understanding of a VAT system and Ullman's
bill in particular, attention now can be focused on some of the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of such a system.
II. TAX POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Adam Smith espoused four criteria for a good tax system which
have become generally accepted as dictating our federal tax policy:
adequacy, simplicity and ease of compliance and administration,
neutrality, and equity or fairness. 21 Using these criteria as guide-
lines, the United States' present system of federal taxation can be
contrasted with a value-added tax.
A. Adequacy
The ability of a tax to raise the amount of revenue necessary for
the functioning of government at a desired level of expenditure is
perhaps the single most important tax policy consideration, at
least in a pragmatic sense. When adequacy is at loggerheads with
another desirable objective, such as fairness or ease of administra-
21. A. SMrrH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 777 (Mod. Lit. ed. 19-).
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tion, it is the other objective that is most often compromised.
Considered solely from an adequacy perspective, the value-ad-
ded tax clearly excels as a potent revenue source. At 1979 levels of
consumption a value-added tax would yield perhaps fourteen bil-
lion dollars in revenue for each percentage point of tax,2 although
with exemptions and preferential rates the yield could be reduced
to nine to ten billion dollars for each percentage point.23 These are
heady figures indeed when it is realized that a VAT of 14 % to 21%
(which is low for most countries with a VAT) could completely re-
place the corporate income tax (which raises a total of about 70
billion dollars in revenue) and the social security tax (which raises
about 120 billion dollars).24
Importantly, the value-added tax is also seen as a politically ac-
ceptable method of raising such revenues. Perhaps because it is
largely invisible, being lumped with the cost of goods and services,
and because it is incurred on a "pay-as-you-go" basis without en-
gendering an account for large accrued liabilities or returns to be
filed by the consumer, it is probably the form of taxation most ac-
ceptable to the public. The closest thing to the value-added tax in
the United States' existing tax structure is the state and local sales
tax, which is usually identified in public opinion surveys as the
least-hated tax.2 5 One study concludes "the real advantage of VAT
is that it is the only broad-based indirect tax that stands a chance
of enactment by the Congress. 2
6
It is this characteristic of the value-added tax that is perhaps
most alarming to its opponents. The fear is that a "relatively pain-
less source of revenue would simply be too attractive for the Con-
22. Tax Restructuring Act of 1979: Hearings on H.R. 5665 Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 134 (1980) (statement of Charles E. McLure) [here-
inafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 5665].
23. Id. at 24 (statement of Treasury Secretary Miller); Treasury Secretary Miller on the
Value-Added Tax, 9 TAX NoTEs 656 (Nov. 12, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Miller].
24. Id.
25. Brannon, Is the Regressivity of the Value-Added Tax an Important Issue?, 9 TAX
NOTES 879, 882 (Dec. 31, 1979) (citing ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
CHANGING PUBLIC ATTITUDES ON GOVERNMENT AND TAXES (1979)). See also Kingson, Value
Added Tax Versus Broader Income Bases: Tax Reform for the Rich or the Not So Rich, 58
CORNELL L. REV. 340, 346 (1973).
26. General Income Tax Problems, supra note 14, at 432 (citing Smith, A Study of Tax
Policy and Capital Formation 24 (prepared for the National Ass'n of Mfrs.)).
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gress and President to resist," leading over time to increased rates
or reinstatement of the taxes supplanted by the value-added tax,
all to finance the expansion of government.2 7 Ullman answered this
concern with the suggestion that a rider be attached to the enact-
ing bill limiting government spending to a percentage of the gross
national product,28 and Long went so far as to suggest a constitu-
tional amendment having the same result.2 9 While anything short
of a constitutional amendment may not be acceptable to those
with fears of excessive governmental spending, the practical diffi-
culties of getting such an amendment must be considered. On the
other hand, if pressures on Congress continue to increase with re-
spect to reducing government spending to control inflation and en-
able a reduction in taxes, a constitutional amendment may become
feasible in the near future. It is possible that the pressures of pub-
lic opinion would be sufficient without a constitutional amendment
to restrain Congress from tampering with the rates or recreating
the supplanted taxes without overwhelming justification. Also, in
the event of a real national emergency, it would be prudent to have
a system on stand-by that could produce large amounts of revenue
very quickly. In any event, the likelihood a VAT would not be used
to increase the overall tax burden is greater if the VAT completely
replaces an existing tax instead of merely reducing several existing
taxes, because reinstatement of the eliminated tax would be much
more likely to draw attention than a simple upward adjustment in
the rates of an existing tax.
To pass the test of adequacy, a tax must not only raise sufficient
revenues to finance the programs for which it is earmarked, but
must do so without placing too heavy a burden on the taxpayers. A
confiscatory tax may have the potential of raising sufficient reve-
nues, but without the support of the people largely responsible for
assessing the tax on themselves, it is a complete failure. Perhaps
this is where the social security tax is today; if not, then it is rap-
idly approaching that point. For this and other reasons to be de-
veloped in this article, it will be suggested that, if there is merit to
a VAT, it lies in the possibility of completely replacing the social
27. Hearings on H.R. 5665, supra note 22, at 134 (statement of McLure).
28. See note 20 supra.
29. Long, supra note 2, at 311.
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security tax, which is not only the weakest tax from a policy stand-
point, but also is under fire because of the question of adequacy.
Because much of the following discussion will be focused on the
social security tax, some background information should add
perspective.
One of the earliest principles to be ingrained into the social se-
curity system was "pay-as-you-go." The theory was that current
contributions should be enough to pay current benefits, with per-
haps a year's cushion, and no more. 0 It was easy, from the very
beginning of the system, to project increases in the tax rate as the
system matured, but Congress was not willing to let its constitu-
ents pay a large tax that wasn't absolutely necessary for present
benefits. 1 This, coupled with early benefits to individuals far in
excess of their contributions, is perhaps responsible for much of
the early popularity of the system. In fact, only one major attack
on the system was made by a serious presidential contender. In the
campaign of 1936, when the Social Security Act was only a year old
and the social insurance provisions were not yet operative, Repub-
lican candidate Alf M. Landon attacked the law as "unjust, un-
workable, stupidly drafted, and wastefully financed." He charac-
terized the saving it forced on workers as "a cruel hoax. '3 2
Nevertheless, when the Ways and Means Committee rejected a
"level premium" rate-a single rate that could maintain the sys-
tem without ever being increased, estimated in 1949 to be about
6% -in favor of a 1.5% rate with minimal increases over the years
necessary to barely keep up with increasing benefits, Robert Ball,
later to become Commissioner of Social Security, wrote:
A pay-as-you-go system financed exclusively from payroll contribu-
tions makes little sense in an old age retirement program .... From
the standpoint of persons who spend a working lifetime under the
program, it seems somewhat absurd to charge first a combined em-
ployer-employee rate of only 1.0 or 1.5 percent and then gradually to
increase the rate to perhaps as much as 11 percent. For social insur-
ance just as for private annuities, it is much easier for both workers
and employers to pay a more or less level rate over a working
30. M. DERTHICK, POLICYMAKING FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 237 (1979).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 185-86.
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lifetime.33
M. A. Linton, a member of the 1939 Advisory Council, also
warned of the difficulties in financing a system where the future
burden was already being projected at close to 20%:
We of this generation... do not propose to pay out any such pro-
portion of our earnings to provide current benefits under the Social
Security Act, but we blithely assume that our children and
grandchildren will be able to do so without serious disturbance to
the economic life of the country. This whole philosophy needs to be
reconsidered. "
Nevertheless, the 1% rate that went into effect in 1937, and
which was scheduled to rise in steps of 0.5% every three years un-
til it reached 3% in 1949, was not actually increased to 1.5% until
1950, and thereafter it was increased at rates just necessary to
maintain the current levels of benefits.35
Actually, it was not until after 1972 that troubles began in ear-
nest for the social security system. The non-controversial basic
program of cash benefits for the aged was administered routinely,
ad hoc benefit increases being enacted as needed. Then came the
major expansion-first disability insurance, then medicare, then an
enlargement of the underlying program. Beginning in 1973, official
annual reports on the system's financial condition showed a pro-
jected long-run deficit (over seventy-five years), and the projected
deficit kept increasing.3 6 The tax rate that was scheduled to be
eleven or twelve percent in the twenty-first century was now pro-
jected to be 20% or more. To make matters worse, beginning in
1975 the annual reports also showed a short-term deficit, and the
forecasts proved accurate. Alarm spread that the system was near
"bankruptcy" when expenditures exceeded income by $1.5 billion
in 1975 and $3.2 billion in 1976.87
The rates which were burdensome for many taxpayers in 1973 at
33. Id. at 240.
34. Id. at 235.
35. Id. at 215, 245.
36. Id. at 381.
37. Id. at 382.
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5.85% for both employer and employee appear frightening to
many at a 7.65% rate, which is scheduled under current law to
take effect in 1990 and all later years, with an ever-increasing wage
base. 8 This has led to calls for reform from every direction; most
are advocating financing part of the program from general reve-
nues and perhaps lessening benefits.39
Reasons for the inadequacy of the projected tax rates are sev-
eral. First, the baby boom generation will begin reaching retire-
ment age about the year 2005, and if the current low fertility rate
continues (women have an average of 1.8 children today compared
to 2.4 in 1970 and 3.7 in the late 1950's), fewer workers will face
this larger retirement population. 0 Further, increasing life expec-
tancy will exacerbate the problem. Also, labor force trends indicate
a shortened work life, due in part to later entry into the work force
because of longer education and in part to the trend toward earlier
retirement (two out of every three workers now elect to retire be-
tween the ages of sixty-two and sixty-four with reduced benefits,
whereas only one out of ten wait until after age sixty-five to retire;
this is to be contrasted to 1960, when half of all men and one-third
of all women who retired waited until after age sixty-five). 4' The
effect of these demographic changes is that the ratio of workers to
beneficiaries will decrease from 3.3 in 1979 to approximately 2.0 in
2030.42
Another reason for the inadequacy of the social security tax rate
structure is. the benefit formula. In 1972 Congress adopted a
formula tying benefits to the consumer price index, effective in
1975.4' The indexed formula did not work properly, however, in
the unanticipated periods of high inflation. Where inflation histori-
cally had been averaging around 2% a year, in 1974 it rose to
38. 42 U.S.C. § 430 (1977).
39. See, e.g., Letter to the Editor, "Fundamental" Social Security Changes Versus
"Tinkering," 10 TAX NoTEs 467 (Mar. 31, 1980); Aaron, Social Security: Proposals for
Change by the Advisory Council on Social Security, 10 TAx NoTEs 243 (Feb. 25, 1980);
Ross, Social Security Today: The Need for Reform, 10 TAx NoTEs 171 (Feb. 11, 1980).
40. Ross, Social Security Today: The Need for Reform, 10 TAX NoTEs 171-72 (Feb. 11,
1980).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. M. DERTHICK, supra note 30, at 384.
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12.2%, twice the rate in 1969, and to everyone's surprise price in-
creases exceeded wage increases."" In 1977, Congress had to amend
the automatic adjustment, leaving it tied to the consumer price in-
dex for persons already retired but tying the benefits promised to
active workers to increases in the wage base.45
From the standpoint of "adequacy", how would a value-added
tax be superior to the payroll tax? In terms of its capacity to pro-
duce revenues, the VAT is not superior. The actuarial future costs
of the social security system are what they are irrespective of the
source or sources of financing. Any superiority of the value-added
tax over the social security tax on grounds of adequacy is instead
rooted in a VAT's acceptability and stability. Whereas the payroll
tax has already perhaps reached its saturation point, the 10%
value-added tax that would replace it would still have room for
acceptable growth. 5 In part, its invisibility is responsible for its
acceptability, but for whatever reason, it is a politically feasible tax
that can quickly rescue a floundering system. As for stability, the
value-added tax would be more slowly affected by sudden changes
in price or wage levels, since a substantial lag is generally found
between such changes and consumers' habits.47 Even if this hy-
pothesis is incorrect, the value-added tax is at least as good as and
is probably better than the social security tax on grounds of
adequacy.
B. Administration
To conform to sound tax policy, a tax should not be too expen-
sive to collect nor too complex in its application. In its pristine
form, the value-added tax is not only simple and easy to adminis-
ter, it also is largely self-policing and actually encourages compli-
ance through its unique system of credits for taxes previously paid.
The credit for taxes paid on purchases is easily calculated from
invoices that show the exact amount of the tax, and the added bur-
44. Id. at 391-93.
45. Id. at 392-408.
46. The rate would be well below that in most countries with a value-added tax. See note
9 supra.
47. Arthur Andersen & Co., Perspectives on the Value-Added Tax 9 (1979) (Subject File
TA 0820, Item 16).
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den of keeping separate totals of taxes paid would be minimal.
Since total receipts from sales and performance of services are
figures that must be calculated for purposes of income taxation,
the only burden added by a VAT would be to segregate exports
and exempt products. For firms performing extensive services
outside the United States, there might be interpretative problems
which require extra bookkeeping (such as determining whether
50% or more of a service is performed inside the United States, as
would have been required under Ullman's bill). If rate preferences
and exemptions could be kept out of the bill, the cost and com-
plexity of administration would be substantially reduced.
Former Secretary of the Treasury G. William Miller has esti-
mated a value-added tax for the United States would involve from
10 to 15 million taxpayers, depending on the number of exemp-
tions.48 This would mean at least 30% more returns would be filed
with the Internal Revenue Service, assuming quarterly returns are
required and no existing tax would be completely replaced. If a
simple value-added tax completely replaced either the corporate
income tax or the social security tax, it is difficult to see how the
cost of administration would be greater after some initial start-up
costs. Multiple rates and exemptions could, however, create sub-
stantial administrative costs. A 1969 study by the National Eco-
nomic Development Office of The United Kingdom of the multiple
rate value-added tax in European countries found that at a 5%
rate the government's cost of administration and compliance would
probably approximate 2% of yield, which is significantly more
than the 0.5% of yield that it presently costs the United States
government to administer the federal tax structure. 9
Costs of ensuring compliance may be reduced, since the natural
pressure on businesses to stay "in the system" to obtain credits for
the taxes they have already paid alleviates the underground econ-
omy problem. But there are still some ways to evade a VAT. For
example, fictitious export documents can be created to generate
value-added tax refunds for goods that in fact were never exported.
Also, for service companies, the tax paid on purchases may be
fairly small so only a small number of taxable transactions need to
48. Miller, supra note 23, at 655; Hearings on H.R. 5665, supra note 23, at 23.
49. Policy Considerations, supra note 13, at 71-72.
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be reported in order to generate tax collections sufficient to offset
credits for the value-added tax paid. After the credits are offset,
services can be offered "underground," free of the tax, with no ad-
verse tax consequences to the company but with a competitive ad-
vantage gained from the lower prices. 50 Even with these possible
schemes of tax evasion, the "underground economy" problem
should be only a fraction of the problem existing under an income
tax system.
From an administrative standpoint, then, the additional costs of
a value-added tax could be negligible if an existing tax is com-
pletely replaced, yet the benefits of improved compliance could be
substantial both in terms of increased revenues and psychological
concepts of fairness among taxpayers. On the other hand, if, as in
Ullman's bill, no existing taxes were completely replaced, the addi-
tional costs would be substantial and the increased compliance and
other benefits would have to be carefully measured to make sure
they were not outweighed by such costs.
No current data has been found to indicate the actual costs of
administering the social security tax, but if simplicity is any mea-
sure, the costs must equal or exceed the costs of administering a
value-added tax (particularly one with few exemptions and prefer-
ential rates). One major complication under the social security tax
has been in determining who is an "employee" subject to the tax
and who is an "independent contractor" exempt from it. A contro-
versy has raged between the IRS and taxpayers since the late
1960's, and the issue has been hotly contested and litigated.51 Ordi-
narily, there are about 20 "tests" that must be applied to deter-
mine if one is a common-law employee for purposes of section 3121
of the Internal Revenue Code,52 but in some cases, such as with
physicians, the twenty tests are ignored and other enumerated
tests are imposed.53 In other cases, the Service has a difficult time
making up its mind; it originally established guidelines for making
50. Hearings on H.R. 5665, supra note 22, at 159-60 (statement of Paul R. McDaniel).
51. S. REP. No. 95-1263, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 209 (1978), reprinted in Law and Commit-
tee Reports, 1978-3 C.B. 507.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Special Ruling, March 2, 1961, 617 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 6375.
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employee designations for real estate sales persons in 1951,1" issued
revised guidelines in 1976,55 and then revoked the new guidelines
in September, 1978, reinstating the 1951 rules.5 6 In the Revenue
Act of 1978, Congress put a freeze on regulations and rulings on
employment status until January 1, 1981 and provided taxpayers
with certain "safe haven" tests.57 It is difficult to recall an area
that has generated more confusion and controversy, and it would
be unlikely that a value-added tax would rival the complexities of
the social security tax.
Taxpayer compliance can also be a problem in the social security
tax. One common scheme of tax avoidance is the use of a "Sub-
chapter S" corporation to enable the worker to withdraw funds
from the corporation that would ordinarily be withdrawn as salary
and thus be subject to the social security tax. Of course, the most
pervasive compliance problem involves the cash transactions that
are never reported.5 8
C. Neutrality
To conform to sound principles of tax policy, a tax should have
no effect on business decisions. If a value-added tax is enacted
without exemptions or zero rates, it will achieve a relatively high
degree of "neutrality". One writer has praised its neutral treatment
of labor-intensive and capital-intensive methods of production, ef-
ficient and inefficient companies, partnerships and proprietorships,
and equity financing and debt financing.59 Arguably, a VAT would
have no effect on the organization, efficiency of operation or
financing arrangements of businesses. If this proved to be the case,
business decisions could be made without undue consideration to
tax factors which presently distort economic decisions. Under the
existing system, tax considerations play a major role in corporate
business decisions, particularly in the area of debt financing versus
54. Mim. 6566, 1951-1 C.B. 108.
55. Rev. Rul. 76-136, 1976-1 C.B. 313; Rev. Rul. 76-137, 1976-1 C.B. 313.
56. IR-2034, September 8, 1978, 789 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 1 6894; IR-2039, Sep-
tember 27, 1978, 789 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) V 9624.
57. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 530(a)(2).
58. For the most recent I.R.S. underground economy report see 10 TAx NoTEs 392-93
(Mar. 24, 1980).
59. Smith, Value-Added Tax: The Case For, 48 HARV. Bus. REV. 77, 79 (1970).
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equity financing.60
It is true the VAT would be neutral if it were applied in the
same manner to all types of businesses and business transactions.
For this to occur, the VAT would have to be imposed upon all
goods and services at the same rate. There is no single-rate VAT in
Europe, and it is questionable whether a single-rate VAT would be
enacted by Congress. All the VAT systems in Europe have two or
three different rates applying to various types of commodities, and
all have various exemptions. Some systems exempt food, others ex-
empt a large variety of services, and favorable treatment is often
given to small businesses. Separate rates, differentials, exclusions
and discriminations are the norm, rather than the exception. 1 The
difficulty in achieving simplicity and neutrality with a mass tax is
evidenced by the experience of state governments with the retail
sales tax.62
If the VAT has exemptions, there must be classifications and
definitions of the items entitled to the exemptions. "Does a lower
rate for food, for example, apply to such items as chewing gum,
soda pop, candy or caviar? Experience with the income tax shows
that even medical services and drugs are not easy to define."6 3 Ex-
emptions and exclusions would reduce economic efficiency by en-
couraging people to make expenditure choices that are less heavily
taxed."
The suspicion that these problems would occur if the VAT is
enacted into law in the United States is probably accurate. One of
the complicating aspects of the bill introduced by Ullman was it
had a different rate for food, housing and medical care than it did
for other goods and services, and it contained a small business ex-
emption.65 Ullman had even proposed a modification to his bill
which would exempt various items. His position was apparently
motivated by pressure from the public to modify the structure of
60. Brannon, Is the Regressivity of the Value-Added Tax an Important Issue?, 9 TAX
NoTEs 879, 881-82 (Dec. 31, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Regressivity of the VAT].
61. Hearings on H.R. 5665, supra note 50, at 155-56.
62. Kingson, supra note 25, at 366, citing Cohen, Treasury Says European Experience
with Value-Added Tax is Favorable, 35 J. TAx. 316, 317 (1971).
63. Hearings on H.R. 5665, supra note 23, at 21; Miller, supra note 23, at 655.
64. Hearings on H.R. 5665, supra note 22, at 132.
65. Id. at 131.
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the VAT to exempt such items as food and medicines. If Congress
ever seriously considers the enactment of a VAT, there is no way
of predicting how many modifications will be placed on the struc-
ture of the tax as pressure from consumer groups and lobbyists
continues to mount.
The "neutrality" lost because of exemptions and differences in
rates, however, is not the same neutrality that is missing in the
present federal tax system. Neutrality that is lost in a VAT system
might affect a decision to enter one industry versus another
(though such a decision is generally based on skills and proclivities,
not tax results), but, unlike the present federal system, decisions
within the same industry relating to formation and operation
should be free of tax-related considerations.
One VAT opponent admits a value-added tax is neutral, but re-
joins that its neutrality emanates not from its fair and evenhanded
application, but from its passage down to consumers."' But ques-
tioning the cause of the neutrality does not render the effects sus-
pect. It can also be argued that a value-added tax is not neutral
because it favors an efficient business over an inefficient business,
since by keeping its indirect costs low an efficient business can
lower its prices but maintain the same profit margin as the less
efficient business. By lowering its prices, the efficient business in-
curs less of a value-added tax liability. It would take warped rea-
soning, however, to argue that this lack of "neutrality" in re-
warding efficiency should be viewed as an objection to the tax.
Although the individual and corporate income taxes do not fos-
ter neutrality, the social security tax is generally viewed as neutral,
although to some extent that depends on whether one believes the
economists who say both the employee's and the employer's shares
of social security taxes have the effect of reducing the take-home
pay of employees, or the economists who say the employer's share,
or some portion thereof, is absorbed by capital in varying degrees
depending on the industry, firm and product. To the extent it is
absorbed by capital, the payroll tax may affect production and in-
vestment decisions.6 7
66. Surrey, Value-Added Tax, The Case Against, 48 HARV. Bus. RE V. 86, 88-89 (1980).
67. Policy Considerations, supra note 13, at 63.
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In contrast, the personal income tax is probably the major dis-
torter of economic decision making. Although in theory it could be
neutral, a substantial number of activities get preferential treat-
ment under the Internal Revenue Code.68 The corporate income
tax is also far from being neutral. It gives preferential treatment to
many activities, and depending on the strength of the industry and
firm, a portion of such tax may either be passed on in higher prices
or borne by capital.6
In summary, introduction of a value-added tax to the tax system
would increase neutrality most where the individual or corporate
income taxes was reduced, and perhaps to a lesser degree where
the social security tax was replaced.
D. Equity
The concept of fairness or equity in taxation is grounded in two
precepts: first, that a tax system should provide equal treatment of
equals ("horizontal" equity); and second, that people differently
situated should bear a tax burden in proportion to their ability to
pay ("vertical" equity).70 Stated differently, horizontal equity
means persons with equal income should bear approximately the
same tax liabilities, and vertical equity means taxes should be lev-
ied in accordance with the taxpayer's ability to pay, ability being
best measured by the taxpayer's income. Accordingly, it is gener-
ally accepted by taxpayers and theoreticians alike that the ideal
tax system is built around a progressive income tax; however, this
has not always been the case.71
In the nation's early history, the tax system was based on con-
sumption taxes-customs duties and excise taxes on tobacco and
alcohol. Louis Eisenstein describes the 1894 transition to the in-
come tax system:
68. Id.
69. Schenk, The Value-Added Tax as a Replacement for Part of the Corporate Income
Tax, 9 TAx NoTEs 767, 769 (Dec. 10, 1979); Savage and Talley, Value-Added Tax, Issue
Brief No. IB 79120, 4 (Nov. 13, 1979) (Cong. Research Serv., Major Issues System).
70. Boskin, Consumption Taxation and Saving: A Debate, 8 TAX NoTEs 189, 190 (Feb.
12, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Boskin].
71. R. FREEMAN, TAx LoOPHOLES: THE LEGEND AND THE REALITY 6 (1973).
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The [Founding] Fathers confidently assumed that for a long time to
come the revenues would derive from imports, excises, "and, in gen-
eral, all duties upon articles of consumption." What they expected
they also deemed desirable. Hamilton had nothing but praise for
taxes on consumption. "The amount to be contributed by each citi-
zen," he explained to all who might be disturbed, "will in a degree
be at his own option, and can be regulated by an attention to his
resources. The rich may be extravagant, the poor can be frugal; and
private oppression may always be avoided by a judicious selection of
objects proper for such impositions." "It is a signal advantage of
taxes on articles of consumption, that they contain in their own na-
ture a security against excess." The poor can protect themselves by
refusing to buy.
Eventually this fiscal attitude provoked a good deal of unkind
criticism. As individual income rises, relatively less is spent and
more is saved. Therefore, in terms of income, the taxes of the well-
to-do were much lower than the taxes of the not-so-well-to-do.
Those who found it difficult to make ends meet were unable to un-
derstand why income spent should be taxed while income saved is
exempt. The solution proposed was a tax on income, whether it was
spent or saved. Many who were dissatisfied came to a more daring
conclusion. Laborers in the East and farmers in the West ominously
proposed that glaring inequalities in wealth should be reduced by
heavier taxes on higher incomes. It was not enough to impose a tax
on income as distinguished from consumption. The tax, they argued,
should also be progressive; the rates should increase as incomes in-
crease. With malice aforethought they sought to reverse the existing
situation, so that the more prosperous would pay a relatively larger
tax than the less prosperous. In the language of today, they re-
quested a redistribution of income.7 2
While the present federal tax system is progressive, the state
and local systems, e.g., retail sales, property and income taxes, are
not progressive. As a whole the tax system in the United States is
either proportional to income or slightly progressive, depending on
whether stockholders or consumers are viewed as in fact bearing
the burden of the tax on corporate income and the employer's por-
tion of the social security tax.73
72. L. EISENSTEIN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION 17-18 (1961).
73. J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 5 (3d ed. 1977).
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At least one economist believes both horizontal and vertical eq-
uity are best served by a consumption tax rather than an income
tax.74 As for horizontal equity, he argues that under the current tax
system two individuals with the same potential lifetime earnings
are taxed very differently depending on their choices regarding
consumption or savings.7 5 A consumption tax, however, would treat
these two individuals identically on a lifetime basis and "would
yield the same present value of taxes independent of when, over
their lifetime, they consumed the present value of their earn-
ings." 76 To the extent that his argument is dependent on the as-
sumption that all individuals will consume the present value of
their earnings over their lifetime, it appears flawed.
As for vertical equity, the same economist states that "it is cer-
tainly clear that many economists think that consumption is a
much better measure of ability to pay than is income. 7 7 But even
if they are wrong and income is the appropriate measure of the
ability to pay, he says, "an enormous amount of research in eco-
nomics reveals that current consumption is a much better measure
of the average income over a long period of time (or what econo-
mists call permanent income) than is current income. 7 8 Therefore,
he concludes that a tax on consumption upholds the principle of
total equity better than a tax on income. The substantial weight of
commentary, however, holds that the value-added tax violates the
principle of vertical equity because it is regressive.79
The most forceful presentation of the effect of the VAT on
progressivity is contained in the testimony of Treasury Secretary
G. William Miller on November 8, 1979 before the House Ways
and Means Committee.80 He presented a graphic chart illustrating
the resulting distribution of tax burdens if the VAT were to com-
pletely replace the individual income tax and the employee portion
of social security taxes. That chart demonstrates that combined in-
74. Boskin, supra note 70.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 5665, supra note 23 at 21; Miller, supra note 23, at 655;
Hearings on H.R. 5665, supra note 22, at 132-33.
80. Hearings on H.R. 5665, supra note 23, at 14; Miller, supra note 23, at 651.
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dividual income and employee social security taxes are progressive,
but a VAT, even if necessities are exempt, is regressive. As a share
of income, combined individual income and employee social secur-
ity taxes are only two percent for families with incomes of less
than $5,000. The percentage increases to 33 percent for families
with more than $100,000 of income. In contrast, under a VAT
without exemptions and at a 23.2 percent rate (the rate required to
equal the 1978 revenue raised by the individual income and em-
ployee social security taxes), the percentage share of income would
be 35 percent for families with incomes of less than $5,000, but
only 6 percent for families with more than $100,000 of income. The
chart also demonstrates what would happen should individual in-
come and employee social security be reduced by $100 billion, re-
taining the same degree of progressivity for these taxes as under
the present structure, and offsetting the revenue loss with a $100
billion VAT without exemptions. The resulting distribution of tax
burdens would be regressive at the lowest income levels and mildly
progressive elsewhere. As a share of income, families with less than
$5,000 of income would pay 17 percent in taxes, families with in-
comes between $5,000 and $10,000 would pay 14 percent, and the
percentage would then increase through the greater income ranges,
so that families with over $100,000 of income would pay only 21
percent of their incomes in taxes. Secretary Miller concluded that
the overall distribution would be "significantly less progressive
than the present combination of income and employee social secur-
ity taxes."81
Many commentators believe, however, that a VAT's regressivity
can be mitigated to a large extent by using exemptions within the
value-added system and credits within the income tax system.82
The credits would be preferable because exemptions create admin-
istrative problems and erode the value-added tax base and its reve-
nue potential. A refundable income tax credit for tax paid on a
necessary amount of consumption avoids the administrative
problems and can be phased out at increased income levels so that,
81. Hearings on H.R. 5665, supra note 23, at 21; Miller, supra note 23, at 654.
82. For specific proposals on how to use income tax credits, see Brannon, The Value-
Added Tax Again-and Again, 7 TAx NoTEs 691 (Dec. 18, 1978); Regressivity of the VAT,
supra note 60, at 879. See also Miller, supra note 23, at 654-55; Hearings on H.R. 5665,
supra note 23, at 21.
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in effect, middle and upper-income groups would still pay tax on
purchases of food and other necessary items."3 The issue that
causes the most emotion and debate is whether a refundable credit
would be effective because of the difficulties in passing it through
to the roughly 25 million individuals who do not file an income tax
return.84 Experience with credits in the income tax system would
indicate that the poor may not be effectively reached,"5 but more
persuasive is the argument that with publicity, special outreach
programs, and perhaps even adjustments in direct expenditure
programs to the poor, the tax credit system within the income tax
structure could be effective in eliminating the regressivity of a
value-added tax.8" This has been the experience in Scandinavian
countries where broad social benefit programs and adjustments to
personal income tax are believed to "more than offset" any ele-
ment of regressivity in the value-added tax of more than 15% .7
Senator Long recognized that the means exist to eliminate regres-
sivity in a value-added tax that can be "every bit as progressive as
the American people want it to be."88
Proponents of a VAT might even defend some regressivity on
the ground that the degree of progression in the present individual
income tax system cannot be justified in terms of equity. As Ros-
well Magill observes, the effect of the high degree to which the rate
schedule rises increases
the incentives of the taxpayer to find ways of avoiding the full im-
pact of the ordinary rates, and .. .the pressures on Congress to
accept provisions in the tax law which mitigate the impact of the
high rates in special circumstances where particular groups of tax-
payers can plead undue burdens. Lower rates would reduce these
pressures on the tax system as well as be more in accord with gen-
eral notions of relative equity."9
83. Hearings on H.R. 5665, supra note 23, at 21; Miller, supra note 23, at 655.
84. Id.
85. Murray, Value-Added Credits: Will They Work?, 8 TAX NoTEs 139 (Feb. 5, 1979).
86. Regressivity of the VAT, supra note 60, at 381-82.
87. Kingson, supra note 25, at 366, citing Cohen, supra note 62, at 316-17.
88P Long, supra note 2, at 312.
89. Magill, Federal Income Tax Revision 90 (1959) (House Ways and Means Comm., 86th
Cong., 1st Sess., Tax Revision Compendium of Papers on Broadening the Tax Base).
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Some say a VAT actually would increase tax equity by taxing
expenditures for consumption in addition to income.
Income represents the worth of what families and their property
contribute to the flow of output-the inputs which make goods and
services available. Income results from what is done for others, what
is put into the economy. Is it not inequitable to discriminate against
the family that produces more because it provides more for others?
Although 'fairness' in taxation will always be debatable, is it not un-
fair to discriminate the most against those who contribute the larg-
est amounts to the stream of output?
A family's expenditure for consumption represents what it gets
from the economy. The goods and services which it takes out of the
total of production provide the benefits it receives. Some of us enjoy
far larger consumption benefits than do others. Tax discrimination
among families on the basis of what they get in consumption, it is
said, is more equitable than discrimination according to what they
contribute to production.9"
Ullman's claims that the proposed VAT is "virtually without
loopholes" and that everyone will pay, including those engaged in
the "underground economy,"9 1 refer to the principle of horizontal
equity-people with equal incomes should bear equal tax burdens.
Whether the proposed VAT would be "virtually without loop-
holes" or not remains to be seen. With effective lobbying, the oil
industry has demonstrated that what some members of Congress
consider a loophole, is to others a means of achieving fairness. A
type of VAT adopted by Michigan was excessively complicated by
concessions made in response to lobbying pressures, 2 and there is
no reason to expect that Congress would not respond similarly to
such pressures. As recently observed by Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr.
(I-Va.), "Lack of discipline resulting in total fiscal irresponsibility
has been the hallmark of the Congress for several decades. Con-
gress has no means to discipline itself except its own restraint-of
90. Harriss, Value-Added Taxation: Thoughts for 1977, 4 TAX NoTEs 4 (May 30, 1977).
91. House Committee on Ways and Means, Hearing Announcement on the "Tax Re-
structuring Act of 1979 (H.R. 5665)" 7 (Oct. 23, 1979) (Committee Print #96-38).
92. Schenk, The Michigan Single Business Tax: A State Value Added Tax?, 8 TAX
NoTEs 411, 412-13 (Apr. 9, 1979).
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which there is none."93
When determining how VAT would effect equity in the existing
federal tax system, the taxes it replaces must be examined. Al-
though the individual income tax is progressive, the payroll income
tax is regressive. First, the amount of earnings that is taxed is lim-
ited; second, the payroll tax has no exemptions or deductions;
third, its rate is constant rather than increasing at higher income
levels; and fourth, income from interest, rents, and profits is not
subject to the payroll tax at all, and persons in the higher income
tax brackets receive most of this kind of income.94 Four members
of the Advisory Council on Social Security took the position that
from an overall economic viewpoint, the social security program is
not regressive since the lowest-paid worker receives roughly three
times as much benefit for his tax dollar as does the highest paid
and since many low-paid workers have the tax refunded to them
under the earned income credit provision.9s However, as one mem-
ber of the Council pointed out, the question is not whether the
program as a whole is regressive, but whether the payroll tax as
such is regressive, and there can be no question that it is.98
It is not enough to say that a value-added tax with income tax
credits and rebates would be progressive or at least not as regres-
sive as the social security tax. The truth is that by removing the
limits on the wage base and implementing a similar system of cred-
its in the income tax structure as advocated for a value-added tax,
the social security tax can be made much less regressive. From a
practical standpoint, however, it is unlikely that the payroll tax
can be manipulated to increase progressivity; it is simply too firmly
entrenched in the tax system in its present form. On the other
hand, when replacing it with a brand new tax, the chances for en-
hancing progressivity in the entire tax system are much greater.
93. Letter from Harry F. Byrd, Jr. to the Editor of the N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1979, re-
printed in The Richmond News Leader, Mar. 20, 1980, at 10, col. -
94. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SEcURrry, SOCIAL SECURITY FINANCING AND BENEFrrs 37
(1979) [hereinafter cited as ADVISORY COUNCIL].
95. Id. at 213.
96. Id. The regressivity has also been excused by calling the tax an "insurance premium,"
and, as such, "the least regressive of the insurance premiums in America." M. DERTHICK,
supra note 30, at 232.
1980]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
E. Conclusion Based on Tax Policy Considerations
A value-added tax, while not a perfect method of taxation, has
the potential to make a significant contribution toward the devel-
opment of a tax system in line with what is considered good tax
policy. Whether this could be achieved as a practical matter in a
politically-charged environment is a matter for speculation, but
consideration of a tax that has the potential to enhance our overall
tax system should not be precluded by skepticism of the political
process. A value-added tax, properly structured, could significantly
improve the existing federal tax system if the social security tax
were eliminated.
Ill. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
Tax policy considerations should not by themselves, however,
determine the acceptability of a new type of tax. Any impact the
tax might have on elements of the national economy other than
the source and amount of revenues should be assessed. The impact
of a VAT in such areas as incentives for savings and capital forma-
tion, the balance of trade, stability and predictability of revenues,
and inflation may well overshadow pure tax policy considerations.
A. Savings and Capital Formation
Taxes on income, both individual and corporate, penalize saving
and encourage consumption. The corporate income tax not only
reduces incentives to save by taxing earnings, but tends to discour-
age saving by taking income away from those who are most in-
dined to save. It is also reasonable to assume that a corporation
with more disposable cash as a result of a reduction in corporate
income taxes would use some of that cash to expand or update its
facilities and equipment. Therefore, substitution of a value-added
tax for part of the corporate income tax could have a significant
positive effect on capital formation.
Since neither the social security tax nor a value-added tax ap-
plies directly to the return from saving, substituting one for the
other would be unlikely to affect savings decisions.98 One commen-
97. Hearings on H.R. 5665, supra note 22, at 131.
98. Miller, supra note 23, at 652; Hearings on H.R. 5665, supra note 23, at 15.
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tator points out that income derived from invested capital is ex-
empt under the payroll tax while under a VAT the tax is merely
deferred until the income used for saving or capital formation is
spent; any minor effect of such a substitution would be short-lived
and insignificant.99
B. Balance of Trade
Based on the assumption that the corporate tax is borne by in-
vestors and not shifted to consumers in the form of higher prices,
Treasury Secretary Miller concluded that the trade balance would
not improve significantly upon substituting a value-added tax for
the corporate income tax.100 To the extent a corporate tax cut
reduces export prices, exports would be aided in the short-term,
but it is unlikely the effect would be significant because of the time
lag between the corporate tax cut and the export price cut. Addi-
tionally, a value-added tax that replaced a corporate income tax
would likely create inflationary pressures and cause labor to nego-
tiate compensatory wage increases, which in turn would cause price
increases more than offsetting any reductions inspired by corporate
tax cuts.101 If there were an improvement in the balance of trade, it
would be because the substitution led to an improved investment
climate and a more productive and competitive domestic economy,
and thus, enhanced capital formation.1 2
If the social security tax were replaced by a value-added tax, the
reduction in the employer portion might be passed along to con-
sumers, at least in part, in lower prices. Secretary Miller therefore
concluded that "[a] modest trade balance improvement might
result. . .. "103
C. Stability
A value-added tax is generally expected to produce more stable
flows of revenue than income taxes, which are dependent on over-
99. Hearings on H.R. 5665, supra note 22, at 131.
100. Miller, supra note 23, at 653; Hearings on H.R. 5665, supra note 23, at 16.
101. Schenk, The Value-Added Tax as a Replacement for Part of the Corporate Income
Tax, 9 TAx NoTEs 767, 770 (Dec. 10, 1979).
102. Id. at 771; Miller, supra note 23, at 653; Hearings on H.R. 5665, supra note 23, at 16.
103. Hearings on H.R. 5665, supra note 23, at 16; Miller, supra note 23, at 653.
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all economic swings. This stability is not absolute, however, for
value-added tax revenues from consumer purchases of luxury items
would still be influenced by a country's economic stability.104 In
any event, a more stable flow of revenue would enable the govern-
ment to more accurately forecast its budget and plan its cash ex-
penditures, and might result in a savings on interest costs on tem-
porary borrowings.
D. Inflation
It is generally accepted that a value-added tax by itself would
cause a one-time increase in the price level, with a possible ripple
effect due to adjustments in wage contracts, social security pay-
ments, and other indexed items over time.105 This price increase
would be offset by the amount of any price reductions passed on to
consumers because of a decrease in the corporate income tax or the
employer's portion of the social security tax.
Other forces might be triggered which would have an effect on
inflation. For example, some price increases caused by a value-ad-
ded tax would undoubtedly run into consumer price resistance and
be self-regulated by the mechanism of supply and demand. Addi-
tionally, if the value-added tax revenues are used by the govern-
ment to balance the budget in lieu of deficit spending, they could
have a salutary effect on the rate of inflation.
The expected impact of a value-added tax on inflation, according
to Professor Smith, "gives it a false and unreal contrast to income
taxes."10 If there is an income tax increase, real incomes are re-
duced and there is less to spend privately even though prices may
not rise. The net effect of a tax which raises revenue through price
increases is the same as a tax which reduces income directly since
they both reduce real disposable incomes.10 7 Professor Smith
would prefer the tax be itemized on retail sales and not included in
the cost-of-living index.108
104. Hearings on H.R. 5665, supra note 22, at 142-43 (statement of Richard A. Hoefs).
105. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 23, at 652; Hearings on H.R. 5665, supra note 23, at 15-
16.
106. Hearings on H.R. 5665, supra note 22, at 96 (statement of Dan T. Smith).
107. Hearings on H.R. 5665, supra note 22, at 140 (statement of Richard A. Hoefs).
108. Hearings on H.R. 5665, supra note 22, at 96 (statement of Dan T. Smith).
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E. Miscellaneous Disadvantages
Opponents of a value-added tax claim that since it is a tax on
consumption, it would fall relatively more heavily on the aged.
They point out this is particularly unfair since the aged have paid
substantial amounts of payroll taxes during their working lives. 109
However, social security payments are automatically indexed to
the consumer price index, so even if the social security tax is re-
placed by a value-added tax, which causes prices to rise, there
should be no detrimental effect on the aged.110
Another objection raised by opponents is that the forty-five
states (not including the District of Columbia) which impose gen-
eral sales taxes would object to federal encroachment into a tax
arena previously held exclusively by states.11 A value-added tax
might make it more difficult for them to raise their sales taxes.
This argument was rejected by Secretary Miller on two grounds:
(1) all levels of government impose certain taxes, such as income
taxes; and (2) total federal, state, and local sales tax collections are
lower in the United States than in most developed countries.112
Another reason to consider replacing the social security tax with
a VAT is the effect of the social security tax on the poor. Not only
is the social security tax regressive, but when it reduces the take-
home pay of a person near the poverty level, the gap is narrowed
between the lowest paying jobs and welfare and unemployment
compensation. It can thus be said to discourage unskilled persons
from seeking employment, thereby contributing to unemployment.
In addition, when viewed as part of a tax structure that includes
the investment tax credit, the social security tax contributes 12.26
percentage points to a 22.26 percent bias against workers at the
lower end of the pay scale whose jobs are most easily automated.1 3
On the other hand, by taxing consumption more than saving, a
value-added tax "would encourage capital formation and thereby
contribute to economic growth-the only method ever demon-
109. Hearings on H.R. 5665, supra note 23, at 16; Miller, supra note 23, at 653; McLuire,
note 110 infra.
110. McLure, Thoughts on a Value-Added Tax, 9 TAx NoTzs 539, 542 (Oct. 22, 1979).
111. Miller, supra note 23, at 655; Hearings on H.R. 5665, supra note 23, at 23.
112. Id.
113. Nasuti, The Value-Added Tax and the Poor, 9 TAx NoT's 383, 384 (Sept. 17, 1979).
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strated to be both efficient and effective in reducing poverty. 1 4
IV. ONE OBSTACLE TO SUBSTITUTING A VAT FOR THE SOCIAL
SECURITY TAX
Thus far, the scorecard is marked decidedly in favor of giving
serious consideration to the replacement of the entire social secur-
ity tax with a progressively structured value-added tax. Yet the
1979 Advisory Council on Social Security considered such a propo-
sal and unanimously rejected it."" An analysis of the Council's rea-
soning indicates most of its arguments have been dealt with in this
article and should not present insurmountable obstacles-the ag-
gravation of inflation, federal intrusion into a revenue source cus-
tomarily reserved for states and localities, and regressivity. How-
ever, one reason advanced by the Council warrants further
analysis:
[A]s compared to the value-added tax [the payroll tax] has some
important advantages. The payroll tax is levied on the same base
used to compute social security cash benefits and thus helps sustain
the principle that social security benefits are an earned right. Be-
cause the payroll tax is a tax on the earnings that determine the
amount of a person's benefits, it has a compelling logic that the
value-added tax does not have.2"
This creation of the appearance of an earned right can be traced
to the genesis of the social security tax. Enacted by Congress in
1935 as part of President Roosevelt's New Deal, a payroll tax of
1% each for employer and employee was to be collected beginning
in 1937 to finance monthly benefits to retired workers starting in
1942.117 Originally, there was to have been a direct relationship be-
tween benefits and total tax payments,'" but before the payment
of monthly benefits actually began, this relationship was weakened
by changes enacted in 1939." ' Payments were to be based on aver-
114. Id.
115. ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 94, at 41-42.
116. Id. at 41.
117. M. DERTHICK, supra note 30, at 213-15.
118. Id. at 214.
119. Id.
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age monthly wages instead of the total amount of wages, depen-
dents of the beneficiary were made eligible, and the progressivity
of the benefit formula was increased. Another round of amend-
ments weakened the relationship even further in 1950,120 when cur-
rent beneficiaries received increases to compensate for increases in
the cost of living, independently of their tax payments. In addi-
tion, 10 million new workers, including many self-employed and
farm and domestic workers, were brought into the system and were
made eligible for benefits after a covered employment period of
only six calendar quarters."1" Through the years liberalized pro-
grams, including the addition of disability benefits and old-age
health insurance, further eroded the relationship between taxes
paid and benefits received.'22 Nevertheless, as the benefits in-
creased the burden of taxation grew from a 1% tax on both em-
ployee and employer in 1937 on a wage base of $3,000, to a 6.13%
tax in 1980 on a wage base of $25,900, with further increases sched-
uled. 23 Because of the growing tax burden and predictions of even
higher rates caused by demographic changes, with rates perhaps as
high as 25% within the next 25 years, 24 the program increasingly
has come under attack. One Commissioner of Social Security has
stated the belief that millions of people feel threatened today be-
cause of "[i]ack of credibility of government in general and the
particular financial crises of social security in the past several
years .... 125
President Roosevelt once explained his preference for a contrib-
utory system to a visitor who complained of the regressive nature
of the tax:
I guess you're right on the economics, but those taxes were never a
problem of economics. They are politics all the way through. We put
those payroll contributions there so as to give the contributors a le-
gal, moral and political right to collect their pensions.... With
those taxes in there no damn politician can ever scrap my social se-
120. Id.
121. Id. at 214-15.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 429-32 (chronology of changes in'the social security laws).
124. Ross, Social Security Today: The Need for Reform, 10 TAx NOTEs 171, 172 (Feb. 11,
1980).
125. Id. at 173.
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curity program.126
Labor supported the regressive tax because it felt benefits would
be higher under the contributory plan and that its political influ-
ence would be greater. 7 Tied in closely was the psychological ar-
gument for payroll taxes: a person told that he is getting a return
from his own "savings" is not going to feel guilty accepting govern-
ment aid; human dignity and self-respect are retained. Finally, the
link between wages and benefits was thought to discipline the de-
mand for expanded benefits. 128
The suggestion is that, although the notion of earned rights was
once necessary to insure wide acceptability of the system, the de-
sired programs have now been "graft[ed] . . . into the social
fabric" 12 9 and there should be no longer any fear they could be
repealed. Moreover, today there is a very weak link between taxes
paid and benefits received, leading to charges that the American
people are being deceived. In the House of Represeritatives, John
W. Byrnes of Wisconsin "did n object to raising the-benefits,.
'But, I do complain when youq ry to make the American people
and everybody else feel that they have paid for what they are get-
ting. It just is not honest and it is playing politics with the old
people of this country.'18o
The "earned right" notion is basically a myth that has been per-
petuated for political reasons. Because the social security system
has become an institution in our society, the need for those politi-
cal justifications no longer exists. The social security tax should be
exposed for what it is-a very regressive tax on some people so
others may get government assistance. The people who pay social
security taxes all their lives but never receive benefits because they
never retire, become disabled, or leave dependent survivors should
not be misled into thinking they are accruing some "earned right".
Stanford G. Ross, former Commissioner of Social Security, be-
lieves people can accept the concept of financing social security
126. M. DERTHICK, supra note 30, at 230.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 239.
129. Id. at 247.
130. Id. at 225.
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with general revenues through a process of education and
reassurance:
We have to reassure people that the government will never renege
on its commitment to provide comprehensive and viable social pro-
tection that effectively meets human needs. Today, that is a prob-
lem. While the government has an undeniable moral obligation,
there is no legal obligation to pay benefits under any and all circum-
stances. Lack of credibility of government in general and the par-
ticular financial crises of social security in the past several years
have left millions of people feeling threatened.
It is time to develop mechanisms that could reassure the public
that mandated benefits will always be paid by the government. One
way of doing this is to consider, for example, a general appropria-
tions statute stipulating that social security benefits will be paid
from time to time from general revenues as needed. This would be
the same kind of statute as that which presently guarantees that
interest on the national debt will be paid.13 1
V. CONCLUSION
The "earned right" concept and possible psychological factors
present the only real obstacles to eliminating the social security
tax and financing the social security system with the revenues from
a value-added tax. That such factors should be considered, and
considered thoroughly, is unquestionable. That such factors auto-
matically preclude the consideration of a value-added tax as a re-
placement for the social security tax is no longer a viable argu-
ment. Social programs are here to stay, and the public can be
educated to see the realities of the social security system and the
social security tax, and the benefits of a progressively structured
value-added tax. If more analysis and debate are necessary, they
should begin now, before the chance for meaningful tax reform is
lost.
131. Ross, supra note 124, at 173.
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